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Abstract  
Corruption is motivated for a lot of factors from different origins. This work researches 
and analyses which macroeconomics factors are affecting at levels of corruption in 
countries. Firstly, the main factors that could to have relationship with the levels of 
corruption have been identified. Later, some factors of them were selected and were 
tested empirically, through a logit regression. The results of this research show there are 
empirical evidence in the relationship between three macroeconomics factors and 
corruption level. In conclusion, corruption is significantly correlated with the 
transparency, political stability and foreign direct investment. Therefore, to combat 
corruption in the countries, the Governments need to focus on improving these factors. 
Keywords: Corruption, transparency, macroeconomics factors, logit regression and 
empirical evidence. 
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MACROECONOMIC FACTORS AFFECTING THE LEVEL 
OF CORRUPTION IN COUNTRIES 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The corruption is defined as the action and effect of corrupting. This is linked to the fact 
that a person performs an action for personal benefit, and that this harms the interests 
of society in general. Nevertheless, the concept of corruption may be ambiguous in some 
respects. According to Soto (2003), corruption varies depending on the country or 
jurisdiction concerned. Because depending on the legislation, moral and ethical codes, 
or its political system, the same act can be considered corrupt in one country and not in 
another. 
In addition, according to Meny (1996), contemporary corruption can be explained in two 
stages. The first stage is included in the period from the mid-twentieth century until the 
80s, and the second stage is included in the period from the 80s to the present day. 
Social scientists maintain that corruption has always existed, what has changed in recent 
decades is the attitude of politicians and citizens towards this. Nowadays, the term 
corruption appears both in political debates and social discussions among the citizenry. 
One of the variables that has encouraged this change in attitude is the transparency of 
information media, especially in countries where freedom of expression of individuals 
and media independence are ensured by law. In view of these circumstances, this stage 
is known as "grand corruption", because it is better known by the population. 
Currently, corruption is a phenomenon that affects most countries around the world, both 
developed and underdeveloped. So, it is an important problem at international level, that 
needs global solutions from politicians and governing authorities of each country. 
Generally, democratic countries are less exposed, because these have a greater level 
of transparency in their governments, but this also means that corruption in these 
countries adopts subtler and complex forms, to make it more difficult to detect. Therefore, 
social scientists suggest that corruption affects all countries, both the poor and the rich 
(Soto, 2003). 
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The most common forms taken by corruption, regardless of the country in question, 
according to La Porta (1997), are as follows: 
- Bribery. 
- Extortion. 
- Agreements between public and private agents, where the private agent is 
favoured by the public sector, in return for a reward to public agent. 
- Embezzlement and fraud. 
- Financial Speculation with public funds, where these resources are used to 
invest in the financial market. 
- Partiality in the application of laws, in the public administration or any kind of 
deliberate decision. 
- Private collusion in public contracts and tenders, where the participants agree 
the minimum levels for the public auction. 
- Use of inside information to make private economic or social decisions. 
Corruption has a negative impact on States that suffer from it. These impacts are various, 
from economic effects to social effects and humanitarian aid. Moreover, there is a strong 
correlation between corruption and poverty, so the combating thereof has become the 
primary objective of many countries, also increasing the importance of preventing rather 
than curing. Many researchers in the field suggest that the most important preventive 
measures are: transparency of institutions to the use of public resources, greater 
independence of the media, and complete independence between the executive and 
legislature. In this context, one of the ways to combat and prevent corruption is 
transparency, becoming a key tool for all States. 
On the one hand, corruption leads to economic inefficiency, because it causes the loss 
of opportunities, the poor decision making of public projects and the delay of those which 
are important to citizenship. On the other hand, corruption incites the reduced investment 
in education and discourages foreign investment, as investors prefer to invest in 
countries that have lower levels of corruption (Mauro, 1995). 
This can be explained by the bribes received by public officials. These bribes are paid 
by private companies who want to be hired to make public projects, causing the 
contractors are not hired because they are more efficient, but because they have been 
bribed. Additionally, all this encourages to the efficient contractors to enter the game of 
fraudulent practices. These bribes cause the cost to increase and decrease the quality 
of public projects, having a negative impact on the quality and productivity of public 
expenditure (Soto, 2003). 
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In conclusion, corruption increases the inadequate distribution of public revenues, so 
that governments charge higher taxes and reduce public expenses. In many countries 
this translates into spending cuts in education and health, hurting the countries society 
that suffers the most. In addition, this also produces a political shock, due to the citizens 
losing their confidence in political representatives, thus producing political crises, 
seriously damaging the democratic values. 
The main goal of this research is to analyse the macroeconomic factors that are directly 
affecting the levels of corruption in a sample of countries. As has already been seen, 
corruption has a negative impact on the countries that suffer from it, and reducing its 
impact is the main objective of many States. Therefore, it is very important to know what 
is behind it, knowing which are the variables that reinforce and diminish the levels of 
corruption. 
Firstly, the possible explanatory factors of corruption will be identified through a review 
of the existing literature of various authors. Then, it will be tested empirically to see to 
what extent it affects the levels of corruption. To that end, a sample of counties will be 
taken and a quantitative methodology will be applied, with the objective of determining 
the causal relationships of the results obtained in an econometric regression. 
The first section of this document introduces the concept of corruption and its 
implications, its economic impact and the goal of the investigation. After that, a review of 
the existing literature will be worked, where the motives of corruption and 
macroeconomic factors that might be affecting the levels of corruption will be identified. 
In the third part, empirical evidence will be tested to evaluate if there is macroeconomic 
factors are affecting the levels of corruption of the countries in the sample. In this part, 
will discuss about the sample, variables and the indicators used to measure these, the 
material used and the econometric analysis of the data. In the fourth section, is regarding 
results obtained and their interpretation. Finally, the findings and conclusions that have 
been arrived to will be explained. 
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REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
THE REASONS FOR CORRUPTION 
 
Bengovic (2005) points out that, the action that causing corruption has to have an 
advantage over the individual or group performing the task. In other words, the corrupt, 
both public and private agent has to make a profit from the corrupt act. So the motive is 
profit, and profit can take different forms, usually these are: 
- Economic reason: When a person performs a corrupt act in exchange for 
economic benefit, either cash or luxury goods such as expensive jewellery. 
- Not economic reason: When the person performs a corrupt act in exchange for 
favourable treatment by another individual. 
Moreover, the same author identifies three types over deeper motivations, as the 
following: 
- When a citizen or a private company bribes a public official to get a right faster 
than another person. For example, a citizen bribes an official to get faster service, 
but this service is completely legal. So, both the citizen or company and the 
official are committing a corrupt act, since the official will receive some favour or 
a financial reward for performing the requested action. This is possible when 
there is little supervision by the State to its public officials, and they can act 
deliberately. 
- When the purpose of bribe to the public official is to obtain a non-legal service, 
which is called administrative corruption. The reasons why this corruption is 
carried out to achieve a privilege that the law does not allow. For example, when 
a company or citizen are bribing a public official to receive public grants that really 
do not apply to them. As noted in the above example, this is due to a lack of 
supervision and legality of public administrative activity. 
- When corruption is focused on changing the regulations to favour of corrupt 
individuals, this is known as "state capture". For example, when a citizen or 
company are bribing a public official in order to build on undeveloped land. These 
acts lead to the public legislator changes the regulation to favour the interests of 
corrupt in exchange for a reward. Consequently, these public policies are not 
formulated to meet the needs of society, if not to a few corrupt agents. 
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In addition to these reasons, there are a number of personal factors amongst corrupt 
persons that encourages to committing fraudulent acts, and these were set by Donald 
Cressey, the model known as the "fraud triangle" (Lopez and Sanchez 2012). 
The three personal factors that drive an individual to perform fraudulent acts are the 
following: 
- Power: This factor refers to the incentive or pressure that a worker receives, 
public or private, in his job to commit fraud. The fraudster must obtain a private 
gain to do the act. 
- Opportunity: This factor refers to the existence of circumstances that facilitate the 
realization of fraudulent acts. In turn, these circumstances will be motivated by 
lack of mechanisms control, or the inefficiency of these if they exist. 
- Rationality or attitude: This is a subjective factor, as it is subject to fraudster profile 
and it is relating to the ethics of each person. Employees who associate the 
fraudulent act as something not dishonourable, will have more reason than the 
rest to commit it. 
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MACROECONOMIC FACTORS THAT MIGHT BE AFFECTING THE LEVELS 
OF CORRUPTION UNDER STUDY IN THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
In this part, macroeconomic factors that may be affecting corruption levels will be 
identified and explained, based on literary and empirical studies of various expert authors 
on the subject, reviewed in this paper. Further, will pose the hypotheses to be tested in 
the empirical analysis. 
 Accountability (transparency): Both vertical accountability and horizontal, have 
an influence on levels of corruption. The vertical accountability is between the 
government and citizens, while horizontal accountability is between the three 
branches of government (legislative, executive and judicial). The argument that 
this variable affects the levels of corruption is the following: A greater control of 
the executive by the legislature and judiciary, results in citizens and investors 
having greater confidence in in the State. In addition, control of the branches of 
government and their transparency to reduce corruption. 
Prats (2008) focuses his empirical analysis on testing this variable, analysing the 
extent to which corruption (dependent variable) is determined by the control 
between branches of government. The methodology applied is to use two 
indicators of corruption, the perception of corruption developed by Transparency 
International, and the other one from the World Bank Institute by various 
researchers, using a methodology unobserved components from surveys 
conducted by more than fifteen different sources. The independent variable 
collects the political constraints, and independent variables are the logarithm of 
GDP per capita and primary enrolment. The sample is made by OECD countries, 
some countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the ancient Spanish, French 
and English colonies. The conclusion reached by the empirical analysis is that 
the controls between branches of government significantly reduce levels of 
corruption, so there is empirical evidence to prove the significance of this variable 
on the level of corruption in a country. 
This conclusion is also supported by Kaufmann (2000), which argues in his 
literary study, that in countries where there is greater independence and 
impartiality of the judiciary, are less exposed to corruption, since courts have the 
capacity and independence enough to resolve legal disputes related to 
corruption. 
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Hypothesis 1: A higher level of transparency in a country will be associated with 
lower level of corruption in this country. 
 Political stability: Countries with greater political stability are associated with a 
lower level of corruption than countries with instability, because in a stable 
context both citizens and political representatives will have less tolerance for 
corrupt actions in the public and private sector, because these actions can 
damage the citizens trust in their representatives. 
This variable is supported by Bigio and Ramirez-Rodan (2006) in their empirical 
review. This review presents evidence of the relationship between corruption and 
a series of development indicators. The sample consists of 209 countries, and 
the methodology used is to make relationships between the corruption indicator 
consists of eight different surveys on corruption, with each independent variable 
to test. 
Hypothesis 2: A greater political stability in a country will be associated with 
lower level of corruption in this country. 
 Educational level: This variable is important because it is assumed that people 
with more education are less permissive with corrupt practices and this means 
that they are less likely to break the law. This theory implies that people with more 
education are less exposed to the action of improper use of public resources for 
their own benefit, as they have received an education in many cases subsidized 
by the state, and corruption adversely affects public spending in education. This 
variable is cited in the empirical study of Prats (2008). There is also empirical 
evidence that shows this relationship, since it is supported by empirical review of 
Bigio and Ramirez-Rodan (2006). 
Hypothesis 3: A higher level of education in a country will be associated with 
lower level of corruption in this country. 
 Culture of illegality: This refers to the existence of social tolerance towards 
private privileges, since societies that have well accepted private enrichment 
through illegal acts are much more exposed to corrupt acts than societies with a 
culture of law and civil morality. This variable is argued by the literary study of 
Soto (2003). 
Hypothesis 4: A greater the culture of illegality in a country will be associated 
with higher level of corruption in this country. 
 Foreign direct investment (FDI): Countries with more foreign investment 
present in their economy will pay more attention to controlling corruption, 
because corruption in a country causes distrust of investors when investing in 
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that country. So, countries with less foreign investment, will be deemed as less 
important to investors, and will be exposed to higher levels of corruption. There 
is empirical evidence that shows this relationship, and it is supported by the 
empirical review of Bigio and Ramirez-Rodan (2006). 
Hypothesis 5: A greater foreign direct investment present in a country will be 
associated with lower level of corruption in this country. 
 Tax burden: The countries with a highest tax burden will be more exposed to 
corruption, since a large tax burden can be motivation to tax evasion, while the 
countries with the lowest tax burden will have less of an incentive of committing 
unlawful acts, such as not paying their taxes to the state coffers. In addition, 
countries that penalize less tax defaults, are encouraging tax evasion. There is 
empirical evidence that shows this relationship, as it is supported by the empirical 
review of Bigio and Ramirez-Rodan (2006). 
Hypothesis 6: A higher tax burden in a country will be associated with higher 
level of corruption in this country. 
 Inequality: Countries with less corruption control have greater diversion of funds 
toward wealthy sectors of the population than to the poorest population. This is 
because, countries with greater inequality have higher concentration to the rich 
agents, and they will commit fraudulent acts to continue maintaining their social 
status. There is empirical evidence that shows this relationship, as it is supported 
by the empirical review of Bigio and Ramirez-Rodan (2006). 
Moreover, Alcaide and Larrú (2007) focus their empirical analysis to test this 
variable, analysing the extent to which corruption is influenced significantly by 
inequality and poverty in a country. The methodology used in the analysis is to 
use two indicators of corruption (one of them prepared by the World Bank and 
the other one prepared by Transparency International), two indicators of 
development (the Human Development Index and per capita income), an 
indicator of poverty (the human poverty index) as an indicator of inequality and 
the Gini coefficient. The sample was composed of 165 countries considered as 
representative of the world. The conclusion reached with the results of the 
empirical analysis it is that corruption is negatively associated with inequality, that 
is, the greater the inequality the greater the corruption exist in a country. 
Hypothesis 7: A greater inequality in a country will be associated with higher 
level of corruption in this country. 
 Income level: Countries with higher income levels will be presented lower levels 
of corruption, since individuals with high purchasing power will not have the same 
needs as individuals with lower purchasing power to take unfair advantage of 
11 
 
public resources for personal gain. This variable is examined in the empirical 
study of Prats (2008) and demonstrated by the results of empirical analysis of 
Alcaide and Larrú (2007), in which they tested that corruption levels are 
correlated with per capita income, proving empirically that a higher per capita 
income is correlated with lower corruption levels. 
Hypothesis 8: A higher level of income in a country will be associated with lower 
level of corruption in this country. 
 
OTHER MACROECONOMIC FACTORS THAT MIGHT BE AFFECTING THE 
LEVELS OF CORRUPTION 
 
In this part, will identify and explain what other macroeconomics factors that may be 
affecting corruption levels, based on literary and empirical studies of various expert 
authors on the subject, reviewed in this paper. These factors will be out of reach of 
empirical analysis. 
 The market regulation by the State: On the one hand, this causes public agents 
to have increased decision-making power in their hands, and on the other hand, 
that private actors might be forced to carry out illegal practices to acquire 
influence of the economy. This variable is pointed by the literary study of Soto 
(2003). Furthermore, this argument is supported by other authors, as the example 
of Kaufmann (2000), which argues that the degree of state involvement in the 
economy is related to the level of corruption in the country, since excessive 
regulation of business private sector and high taxes, drive a higher incidence of 
corruption. 
 The salaries of civil servants: There are reasons to argue that in countries 
where the income of civil servants are low there is more corruption, due to the 
officials doing malpractices to get a bonus in their salary to meet their income 
needs. This variable is pointed out by the literary study of Soto (2003). 
 Quality of public administration: This quality prevents corrupt acts being 
carried out, as there are mechanisms of control and supervision of the actions of 
public officials. Private agents will not be so exposed to corrupt actions if the 
administrative system is efficient. In contrast, in countries where the quality of 
administrative services is low, agents will be tempted to bribe government 
officials to obtain greater efficiency of services. This variable is proposed by the 
literary study of Soto (2003). 
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 Citizen Political Participation: This variable is signalled because in countries 
with a higher degree of citizen participation, democratic countries, there is a 
greater sense of general wellbeing, where corruption is less tolerated, since this 
adversely affects the social welfare state. While in non-democratic societies, 
there is more tolerance to corruption, due to there being no sense of general 
wellbeing, and corruption can be understood as individual enrichment that 
everyone pursues. This variable is marked by the literary study of Soto (2003). 
Moreover, this argument is supported by the literary study of Kaufmann (2000), 
which argues that there are political determinants, such as fundamental rights 
and civil liberties of citizens of a country, which are the key to explaining. The 
corruption variable as countries that have stronger political rights, accompanied 
by civil liberties, have less corruption. Since citizens have influence on the 
political power of the country and elect political representatives who are not 
involved in corruption. 
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METHODOLOGY 
 
VARIABLES AND INDICATORS 
 
In this section, the target study variables will be described and as will the indicators that 
have been used to describe them. Table 1 shows the summary of the variables and 
indicators, as well as showing the source of such data which has been collected. 
Dependent Variable: 
The dependent variable is corruption. To measure this variable, the 'Perceptions 
Index Corruption' (CPI) 2015 is taken as an indicator. The index was created in 1995 
by Transparency International (TI), a non-governmental organization devoted to 
combating corruption, both the public sector and the private, and trying to bring together 
a global coalition of governments. The CPI is a composite indicator that measures the 
perception of corruption in the public sector in 168 countries. In addition, this index is 
standardized, allowing the comparison of levels of perception of corruption among 
different countries and compare between different points in time. The data sources are 
prepared on a scale of 0 to 100, where 0 is the highest corruption perception level, and 
100 is the lowest level. 
Independent and control variables: 
After reviewing literature and empirical studies on the subject, potential macroeconomic 
factors that influence levels of corruption have been converted into independent 
variables in this study and are presented below, structuring them in the following way: 
- Independent variables that are taken into account when making the empirical 
analysis of this paper, are those that are used to measure the effects they have 
on the levels of corruption in the countries that form the sample. 
- Control variable, which is an independent variable, but not handled in the 
empirical analysis and are remaining constant to neutralize their effects on the 
dependent variable. 
- Independent variables out of reach of empirical analysis of this paper, but it 
would be desirable to study the relationships of these variables with the levels of 
corruption in future work in this area. These variables may be affecting the levels 
of corruption, but are beyond the empirical analysis due to lack of availability of 
data in some of the countries that make up the sample. 
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The independent variables and indicators that will be taken to reference them are the 
following: 
- The explanatory variable that collects state transparency will be measured 
by the ranking of the right to information, known as ranking of transparency, 
because it evaluates soundness of the legal framework of a country to guarantee 
the right to information. This ranking evaluates the legislative framework; it does 
not evaluate proper implementation or enforcement. The data obtained from this 
index are from 2013, since it is the most recent data. 
This index was developed by Access Info Europe and the Centre for Law and 
Democracy. The methodology used to create this ranking was done by analysing 
61 indicators that were awarded scores between 0 and 2, a sample of 100 
countries around the world; so the final index takes a value of 0 when there is no 
transparency in the state, and 150 if there is perfect transparency. 
In addition, inside this ranking are not all countries that form the sample of this 
work, the large majority of them are African countries. Therefore, starting with the 
assumption that countries that are not included in the ranking will take a value 0, 
since if not found in the ranking is because their states are not transparent. 
- The explanatory variable that collects political stability will be measured by 
the Index of Political Stability in 2014, and is qualified between -2.5 (weak political 
stability) and 2.5 (strong political stability). This index includes components such 
as the risk of military coup in a region, rebellions, political terrorism, civil war, 
armed conflict, and climate of instability that offers foreign investors among 
others. The sample of this index is made up of 200 countries worldwide and is 
prepared by the World Bank, although data has been extracted from another 
source. 
- The explanatory variable that collects the culture of illegality will be 
measured through a ranking by the World Bank in 2015, in which a score is given 
to countries on fulfilling their contracts. Scores can range from 1 to 189; 1 is the 
highest score (the country meets all contracts) and 189 the lowest score (the 
country does not comply with all contracts). 
This indicator measures the time and cost to resolve a commercial dispute 
through the Regional Court of First Instance, also introduces an index on the 
quality of the judicial process, which assesses whether each of the economies in 
the sample, formed by 189 countries around the world, has adopted a series of 
best practices that promote quality and efficiency in the judicial system. Data was 
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collected through study of the codes of civil procedure and by questionnaires duly 
completed by trial lawyers and local judges. 
- The explanatory variable that collects educational level will be measured by 
various indices, but for this research is going to take the enrolment in secondary 
level. The gross enrolment rate in secondary school corresponds to the total 
number of students enrolled in secondary education, regardless of age, 
expressed as a percentage of the total population of official secondary school 
age. This rate may exceed 100% due to the inclusion of older and younger 
students at the official age, because there are students that repeat grades or 
early or late entry at that level of education. 
The data obtained for this work are of the year 2014. However, in those countries 
in which the sample has no existing data for that year, takes instead figure from 
the previous year. 
- The explanatory variable that collects foreign direct investment will be 
measured by the percentage of GDP. Foreign direct investment is the net inflow 
of investment in a country to obtain a long lasting control in the management 
(usually 10% or more of the shares which carry voting rights) of companies in 
that country. This index reflects net inflows in the economy divided by GDP. 
As this variable is very volatile and suffers significant fluctuations from one year 
to another, in some countries of the sample, it will take the average of the data 
from years 2012, 2013 and 2014. 
- The explanatory variable that collects the tax burden on the citizens of 
country will be measured by the percentage of GDP that represents the tax 
revenue, and these are composed of compulsory transfers to the central 
government for public purposes. Certain compulsory transfers such as fines, 
sanctions, and most social insurance contributions are excluded. Refunds and 
corrections of erroneously collected tax revenue are considered negative income. 
The data obtained for this work are of the year 2014. However, in those countries 
in the sample that has not data for that year, the figure from the previous year I 
taken instead. 
- The explanatory variable that collects income levels will be measured by 
GDP per capita, expressed in dollars at current international prices. The GDP per 
capita, or income per capita, is the relationship between GDP and the number of 
inhabitants of a country. GDP by purchasing power parity (PPP) is gross 
domestic product converted to international dollars using rates of purchasing 
power parity. This indicator is used because it is in the best position to estimate 
the wealth of the population of a country, and this is directly related to the quality 
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of life of the inhabitants of a country. However, this index does not take into 
account the income inequality, however there is another index that measures it 
in the literature. The data used are those for 2014. 
- The explanatory variable that collects inequality of a country will be measured 
using the Gini coefficient, since this coefficient shows the level of income 
distribution. The coefficient is 0 if the income is distributed equitably amongst the 
entire population (perfect equality), while the coefficient is 1 when only one 
person has all the wealth (perfect inequality). The data used are those for 2014. 
The control variable is: 
- Geographical area: It is based on the assumption in this paper that the 
geographical area of each country of the sample has an impact on levels of 
corruption. Therefore, to collect the effect of this variable on the dependent 
variable four dummies are used to represent four types of geographical area 
where nearly all countries of the sample is included. The methodology was as 
follows: Firstly, the groups of countries to work with were selected with would 
work, and once defined these, countries of each group were selected that bear 
similarities between them, such as cultural, social, economic and policies; to 
thereby deal with homogeneous countries within each block. The defined groups 
representing the geographical area are: 
o Group of European countries: This block has not been represented by a 
dummy variable. Since are not as many created dummies as blocs of 
countries, therefore causing a lineal combination and the model would be 
irresolvable. For this reason, as many variables as blocks have been 
created minus one, in this case "dummy Europe" has been omitted. 
o Group of African countries (dummy Africa): It takes a value of 1 when it 
is an African country, and value of 0 when it is a non-African country. 
o Group of Asian countries (dummy Asia): It takes a value of 1 when it is 
an Asian country, and value of 0 when it is a non-Asian country. 
o Group of South American countries (dummy South America): It takes a 
value of 1 when it is a South American country, and value of 0 when it is 
not a South American country. 
o Group of other countries (dummy other): It takes a value of 1 for those 
countries that are not found in any of the above four groups, and value of 
0 when it comes to countries that are already within the above groups. 
Countries that are part of this group, as discussed below are: Australia, 
USA and Canada. 
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Independent variables out of reach of empirical analysis of this paper due to lack of 
availability of data are the following: 
- The market regulation by the state. 
- The salaries of civil servants. 
- Quality of public administration. 
- Citizen Political Participation. 
 
Table 1. Summary of variables and indicators. 
Variable Indicator 
Minimum 
theorical 
Maximum 
theorical 
Source 
Corruption 
Perceptions 
Index 
Corruption 
(CPI) 
2015 
0 
“the most 
corrupt” 
100 
“the least 
corrupt” 
Transparency International 
(2016) 
http://transparencia.org.es/
wp-
content/uploads/2016/01/ta
bla_sintetica_ipc-2015.pdf 
Transparency 
Ranking of 
the right to 
information/ 
Ranking of 
transparency 
2013 
0 
“the least 
transparent” 
150 
“the most 
transparent” 
Datosmacro.com (2013) 
http://www.datosmacro.co
m/estado/indice-derecho-
informacion 
Political 
Stability 
Index of 
Political 
Stability 
2014 
-2.5 
“the least 
stable” 
2.5 
“the most 
stable” 
TheGlobalEconomy (2014) 
http://es.theglobaleconomy.
com/rankings/wb_political_
stability/ 
 
Culture of 
illegality 
Ranking of 
contract 
enforcement 
2015 
1 
“the most 
legal” 
189 
“the least 
legal” 
Doing Business (2015) 
http://espanol.doingbusines
s.org/rankings 
 
Education 
level 
Index of the 
Enrolment in 
Secondary 
2014 
0% <100% 
World Bank (2016) 
http://datos.bancomundial.o
rg/indicador/SE.SEC.ENRR 
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Foreing direct 
investment 
% of GDP it 
represents in 
a country 
2012, 2013, 
2014 
0% 100% 
World Bank (2016) 
http://datos.bancomundial.o
rg/indicador/BX.KLT.DINV.
WD.GD.ZS 
Tax burden 
% of GDP it 
represents in 
a country 
2014 
0% 100% 
World Bank (2016) 
http://datos.bancomundial.o
rg/indicador/GC.TAX.TOTL
.GD.ZS 
Income level 
GDP per 
capita 
(expressed in 
$ at current 
international 
prices) 
2014 
0 - 
World Bank (2016) 
http://datos.bancomundial.o
rg/indicador/NY.GDP.PCA
P.PP.CD 
Inequality 
Gini 
coefficient 
2014 
0 
“perfect 
equality” 
1 
“perfect 
inequality” 
World Bank (2016) 
http://datos.bancomundial.o
rg/indicador/SI.POV.GINI 
Source: Prepared by author. 
 
SAMPLE AND SELECTION PROCESS 
 
The target population of study is composed by 41 countries around the world, whose 
macroeconomic data are found in the sources described in the previous section. The 
main goal of countries selection is to create a representative sample, although it has 
been reduced to these countries, because only these countries are in possession of the 
complete information needed. Groups of countries, and countries that form are as 
follows: 
- European countries: Germany, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, France, Greece, 
Italy, Netherlands, United Kingdom and Sweden. 
- African countries: Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Guinea, Kenya, Mali, Morocco and 
South Africa. 
- Asian countries: China, Philippines, India, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Pakistan, 
Russia, Thailand and Turkey. 
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- South American countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay. 
- Other countries: Australia, Canada and USA. 
In Annex A, the database is collected, it has been created for this exhibition, where all 
data variables and indicators appear. 
 
DESCRIPTION OF THE MODEL 
 
The model has been defined through a logit regression, since this type of regression is 
used to predict the result of a categorical variable, which is the case of the dependent 
variable of the model described in this paper, which represents the level of corruption in 
a particular country. For this reason, the dependent variable must be defined so to adopt 
a limited number of categories according to the independent variables. The categories 
of the dependent variable are determined by the ranking of "Perception Index 
Corruption", where countries are ordered from least to most corruption, where a value of 
100 indicates the lowest level of corruption, and the value 0 indicates the highest level 
of corruption. 
Based on the proposed hypotheses and variables defined above, it is possible to 
establish the following relationship: 
𝐂𝐎𝐑𝐑𝐔𝐏 𝐢 = β1TRANS i+ β2P.S i+ β3C.I i+ β4E.L i+ β5F.D.I i+ β6T.B i+ β7INEQ i+ 
β8dummy.AF i+ β9dummy.AS i+ β10dummy.SA i+ β11dummy.O i+ µ i 
 where CORRUP is the categorical dependent variable, TRANS is the independent 
variable representing transparency, P.S is the independent variable representing political 
stability, C.I is the independent variable representing the culture of illegality, E.L is the 
independent variable representing the education level, F.D.I is the independent variable 
representing foreign direct investment, T.B is the independent variable representing the 
tax burden, INEQ is the independent variable representing inequality; dummy.AF is the 
dummy variable that takes value 1 when it is an African country, dummy.AS is the 
dummy variable that takes value 1 when it is an Asian country, dummy.SA is the dummy 
variable that takes value 1 when it is a South American country, dummy.O is the dummy 
variable that takes value 1 if it is Australia, USA or Canada; and µ is the error term, which 
reflects the effect on the levels of corruption of all other variables not included in this 
model. 
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The test of multicollinearity of the variables has been important, as this is a severe 
problem, because it can increase the variance of the regression coefficients, making 
them unstable, and the consequences of this would be: On the one hand, the coefficients 
may appear insignificant even when there is a significant relationship between the 
explanatory variable and the dependent variable; and on the other hand, these same 
coefficients may have the wrong sign. 
To test the multicollinearity a TEST VIF is used, to quantify the severity of multicollinearity 
in the analysis of the ordinary least squares regression (OLS), analysing the correlation 
structure of the explanatory variables and examining factors of variance inflation. 
Finally, the variable representing the income level has not been included in the model 
because it shows multicollinearity problems, as it has a strong correlation with the other 
explanatory variables of this model. So, the hypothesis about the effect has income level 
on corruption level, could not be tested empirically. 
The material used for the data analysis of this study was Stata, a statistical software. 
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RESULTS 
 
DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF THE SAMPLE 
This section will perform a descriptive analysis of the sample, in order to conveniently 
summarize the information contained in the database in which the empirical analysis of 
this paper is supported. This will allow to draw precise conclusions from data collected 
sample. Statisticians with whom will work this section are listed in Table 2, and these 
are: the mean, standard deviation, minimum, maximum and the median, of each of the 
variables with which it has been worked. It will then be discussed which are the most 
important of these. 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
Varible Mean S.D. Min. Median Max. 
Corruption 51.829 21.787 25 38 91 
Transparency 64.22 38.568 0 70 128 
Political stability -0.16 0.931 -2.44 -0.08 1.23 
Culture of 
illegality 
78.098 54.269 1 59 180 
Education level 0.964 0.266 0.36 0.99 1.63 
Foreign direct 
investment 
3.051 4.752 -3.13 1.7 23.4 
Tax burden 19.073 7.556 9.2 16.5 37.2 
Inequality 0.396 0.099 0.249 0.376 0.631 
Source: Prepared by author. 
 
Corruption: The five most corrupt countries of the sample, according to the Index of 
Perception of Corruption, are: Guinea, Kenya, Russia, Pakistan and Argentina. As they 
are the worst rated. While the five least corrupt countries in the sample are: Denmark, 
Sweden, Netherlands, Singapore and Canada. 
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Transparency: The five least transparent countries of the sample, according to the 
ranking of the right to information, are: Algeria, Egypt, Kenya, Mali and Morocco. While 
the five most transparent countries are: India, Mexico, Ethiopia, South Africa and Brazil. 
This may seem contradictory, because some countries that have been poorly rated in 
the Index of Corruption Perception, appear as the most transparent of the sample. But 
this is due to the transparency variable being collected from by the right to information, 
and this measures the strength of legislative framework to guarantee the right to 
information, but does not evaluate the correct application of the law. The conclusion that 
emerges from this information is that some countries could have a good legal framework 
which guarantees the right to information, but they may not be applying correctly their 
laws. 
Political Stability: The five countries of the sample with more political stability are: 
Singapore, Canada, Australia, Sweden and the Netherlands. While the five countries 
with less political stability are: Pakistan, Mali, Egypt, Kenya and Ethiopia. 
Culture of illegality: According to the index that has been used to measure this variable, 
the five countries of the sample that more contracts fail to comply are:  Colombia, India, 
Indonesia, Egypt and Pakistan. While the five countries that less contracts fail to comply 
are: Singapore, Australia, Russia, China and Germany. 
Educational level: To refer to the educational level the total students enrolled in 
secondary education is taken, expressed as a percentage of the total population in the 
official age to attend high school. The five countries of the sample that have more 
percentage of students enrolled are: Belgium, Australia, Netherlands, Spain and 
Denmark. While the five countries that have less percentage of students enrolled are: 
Ethiopia, Guinea, Pakistan, Mali and Kenya. As can be seen from Table 2, there is a 
large difference between the country that has more students, in this case Belgium, with 
the country that has less students, Ethiopia. This shows the existent inequality between 
countries in this area.  In addition, the education level is represented by a quantitative 
index, not qualitative, since it does not measure the quality of education in the countries, 
and this has to be considered. 
Foreign direct investment: The five countries of the sample that more foreign direct 
investment has in their economies are: Netherlands, Singapore, Chile, Uruguay and 
Peru. While the five countries that have less are: Belgium, Denmark, Japan, Sweden 
and Italy. As in the case of transparency, the data of this variable may seem a bit 
contradictory, because countries with better scores on political stability and corruption 
perception, have less foreign direct investment in their economy. But this can be 
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explained by strong speculation that has done in recent years in the economies of 
developing countries, for example Latin America. Therefore, three of these developing 
countries are among the top five economies in the sample that receive more foreign 
direct investment. 
Tax burden: The five countries of the sample that support a higher tax burden are: 
Argentina, Algeria, Denmark, Guinea and Mexico. While the five countries that support 
a lower tax burden are: Ethiopia, China, India, Japan and Pakistan. 
Inequality: According to the Gini coefficient, the five countries of the sample that have 
more level of inequality are: South Africa, China, Bolivia, Brazil and Colombia. While the 
five countries that have less level of inequality are: Sweden, Netherlands, Belgium, 
Denmark and Germany. 
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ANALYSIS REGRESSION MODEL 
This section will perform the analysis of the regression model. The results of the model 
estimation are listed in Table 3, which shows: the estimated coefficient for each of the 
explanatory variables, the expected sign of the coefficient according to the approach of 
the hypothesis, the standard error and the p- value, besides the Chi2 and R2. Below, the 
results will be discussed and interpreted, in order to empirically test the hypothesis. 
Table 3. Regression of the relationship between corruption and macroeconomic factors. 
 Dependent variable: Level of corruption 
Independent Variables 
Expect 
sign 
Coef. Std. Err. P-value 
Transparency + 0.018** 0.008 0.037 
Political Stability + 2.062*** 0.637 0.001 
Culture of illegality - -0.001 0.007 0.891 
Education Level + 3.118 2.088 0.135 
Foreing Direct Investment + 0.158** 0.078 0.043 
Tax burden - 0.008 0.053 0.878 
Inequality - -3.848 4.017 0.338 
Dummy Africa  -0.774 1.43 0.588 
Dummy Asia  -0.219 1.483 0.853 
Dummy South America  -2.681* 1.393 0.054 
Dummy Other  0.188 1.241 0.88 
Number of obs.= 41   
* Level of significance of 0.1 
** Level of significance of 0.05 
*** Level of significance of 0.01 
Chi2= 61.79  
Prob > Chi2= 0.000  
R2= 0.239  
Source: Prepared by author. 
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The statistical significance of the model has been determinate by Chi2. The null 
hypothesis claims that coefficients of all the variables included in the model are equal to 
0. However, the alternative hypothesis claims that coefficients are significantly different 
from 0. If the probability of Chi2 associated to the value of the test was less than 0.05, 
the null hypothesis would have to be rejected. The p-value of the Chi2 is less than 0.05, 
it is concluded that the model is significant at the 0.1% level. The null hypothesis is 
rejected, so that the adequacy of the equation is accepted to explain the level of 
corruption in a country. 
In addition, R2 is also used to determine the goodness of fit. It measures the explanatory 
capacity of the model. The results indicate that the independent variables included in the 
model explained the 23.9% of the behaviour of the dependent variable, level of 
corruption. 
Then the statistical significance of each explanatory variable is determined: 
- Transparency: The sign of its coefficient is positive, so when the level of 
transparency of a country increases, the score in perception levels of corruption 
also increases. That means the country is less corrupt. The p-value is 0.037, so 
this variable is significant at the 5% level. 
The hypothesis for this variable is: a higher level of transparency in a country will 
be associated with a lower level of corruption in this country. The sign of the 
coefficient has been as expected, and empirical analysis has shown the 
significance of this variable, so the hypothesis is tested and is not rejected. 
- Political Stability: The sign of its coefficient is positive, so when political stability 
of a country increases, the score in perception levels of corruption also increases. 
That means the country is less corrupt. The p-value is 0.001, so this variable is 
significant at the 5% level. 
The hypothesis for this variable is: a greater political stability in a country will be 
associated with a lower level of corruption in this country. The sign of the 
coefficient has been as expected, and empirical analysis has shown the 
significance of this variable, so the hypothesis is tested and is not rejected. 
- Culture of illegality: The sign of its coefficient is negative, so when the culture 
of illegality of a country (breach of contracts) increases, the score in perception 
levels of corruption decreases. That means the country is more corrupt. The p-
value is 0.891, so this variable is not significant because it is above the level of 
significance of 10%. 
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The hypothesis for this variable is: a greater culture of illegality in a country will 
be associated with a higher level of corruption in this country. The sign of the 
coefficient has been as expected, but the results of the empirical analysis have 
not shown the significance of this variable, so this is statistically irrelevant and 
the hypothesis is not fulfilled and is rejected. 
- Education level: The sign of its coefficient is positive, so when the level of 
education of a country increases in levels, the score in perception levels of 
corruption also increases. That means the country is less corrupt. The p-value is 
0.135, so this variable is not significant because it is above the level of 
significance of 10%. 
The hypothesis for this variable is: a higher level of education in a country will be 
associated with a lower level of corruption in this country. The sign of the 
coefficient has been as expected, but the results of the empirical analysis have 
not shown the significance of this variable, so this is statistically irrelevant and 
the hypothesis is not fulfilled and is rejected. 
- Foreign direct investment: The sign of its coefficient is positive, so when foreign 
direct investment of a country increases, the score in perception levels of 
corruption also increases. That means the country is less corrupt. The p-value is 
0.043, so this variable is significant at the 5% level. 
The hypothesis for this variable is: a greater foreign direct investment present in 
a country will be associated with a lower level of corruption in this country. The 
sign of the coefficient has been as expected, and empirical analysis has shown 
the significance of this variable, so the hypothesis is tested and is not rejected. 
- Tax burden: The sign of its coefficient is positive, so when the tax burden of a 
country increases, the score in perception levels of corruption also increases. 
That means the country is less corrupt. The p-value is 0.878, so this variable is 
not significant because it is above the level of significance of 10%. 
The hypothesis for this variable is: a higher tax burden in a country will be 
associated with a higher level of corruption in this country. The sign of the 
coefficient has not been as expected, as it shows the opposite of the hypothesis 
to be tested. In addition, the results of the empirical analysis have not shown the 
significance of this variable, so this is statistically irrelevant and the hypothesis is 
not fulfilled and is rejected. 
- Inequality: The sign of its coefficient is negative, so when inequality of a country 
increases, the score in perception levels of corruption decreases. That means 
the country is more corrupt. The p-value is 0.338, so this variable is not significant 
because it is above the level of significance of 10%. 
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The hypothesis for this variable is: a greater inequality in a country will be 
associated with a higher level of corruption in this country. The sign of the 
coefficient has been as expected, but the results of the empirical analysis have 
not shown the significance of this variable, so this is statistically irrelevant and 
the hypothesis is not fulfilled and is rejected. 
- Dummies reflecting the effect of the geographical area on the levels of 
corruption: The four coefficients of dummies have a negative sign. So, when 
these variables take a value of 1, the scores in perception levels of corruption 
decreases. That means the country is more corrupt, regarding the omitted 
dummy of Europe. However, analysing the p-value, only the dummy representing 
the South American countries has a significant effect on levels of corruption, as 
its p-values is 0.054, which is significant at the 5% level. 
The results of this study show that there is empirical evidence to assert that there is a 
direct relationship between transparency, political stability and foreign direct investment 
on the levels of corruption. 
On the one side, countries that use more efficient mechanisms of accountability with their 
citizens will be less exposed to corruption, because the branches of government will be 
more controlled by citizens and this will prevent the implementation of unlawful acts. 
These results are in tune with some mentioned studies in the review of literature, such 
as Prats (2008) and Kaufmann (2000). 
On the other side, countries with greater political stability, are less exposed to corruption, 
as demonstrated by the empirical analysis. Because, as suggested by Bigio and 
Ramirez-Rodan (2006), in a context of political stability, both the public and private actors 
of a country will have less tolerance for corrupt actions, since these could seriously 
damage the stability of that country. 
Finally, this research also shows that the weight of foreign direct investment in one 
country has an impact on levels of corruption. As the empirical review of Bigio and 
Ramirez-Rodan (2006) suggests, this variable is strongly related to the confidence of 
investors in the countries where they want to invest. Since, countries with more foreign 
direct investment are going to commit fewer corrupt acts to avoid damaging the 
confidence of foreign investors. 
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CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
Corruption is an important problem that is prevalent to a lesser or greater extent at a 
global scale, there is not a single country that is not exposed to it. Corruption has always 
existed. However, in the last few years, corruption has become an issue of great media 
interest and of great significance, because of large media diffusion of such a topic. 
The corrupt actions have a negative impact on the civic, private and public sectors in 
each State. Because it undermines the legitimacy of public institutions, strikes at society, 
moral order, harmony, justice and the comprehensive development of populations. 
Therefore, the fight against it has become the target of agencies and institutions, 
including Transparency International, a non-governmental organization on a universal 
scale entirely dedicated to fighting corruption. It works by promoting greater transparency 
and the realization of the measures of accountability. 
For these reasons, combating corruption has become the aim instead of repairing the 
damage caused by it, because using preventative measures could reduce levels of 
corruption, until it is totally eliminated at some point in the future. Therefore, this paper 
has reviewed the existing literature, which has revealed what could be the 
macroeconomic factors that could be affecting negatively or positively the levels of 
corruption. 
This paper has made an econometric analysis providing empirical evidence of which 
macroeconomic factors affect significantly the levels of corruption. To this end, it has 
created a database with several dependent variables represented by indicators, and a 
sample that has been drawn from 41 countries worldwide. 
The results of the econometric analysis have shown that transparency, political stability 
and foreign direct investment are factors that have a direct relationship with the level of 
corruption. These three variables reduce the levels of corruption in countries. 
Consequently, States that promote policies and measures to increase transparency, 
political stability and the inflow of foreign direct investment, will experience lower levels 
of corruption. 
This analysis presents some limitations that could lead to future research. For example, 
the sample has been reduced to 41 countries because only these possessed all 
complete data. Moreover, there were factors identified by various authors which have 
not been included in the analysis, due to the lack of data in some of the countries that 
form the sample, these have been: market regulation by the State, salaries of civil 
servants, quality of public administration and citizen political participation. In addition, 
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future research could focus on other indexes that have not been available to this 
research, to measure the effectiveness or quality of the variables under study, and not 
quantity. For instance, the education and transparency have been represented by 
quantitative variables; transparency is collected in this work by the ranking of the right to 
information, but does not evaluate the correct application of the law. 
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ANNEXES 
 
ANNEX A. DATABASE 
Sample countries Corruption Transparency 
Political 
Stability 
Culture of 
legality 
Education Level 
Foreing 
Direct 
Investment 
Germany 81 52 0,93 12 102,00% 1,1 
Belgium 77 59 0,71 53 163,00% -3,13 
Denmark 91 64 0,94 37 130,00% 0,13 
Spain 58 76 0,32 39 131,00% 2,57 
France 70 64 0,36 14 111,00% 1 
Greece 46 65 0,02 132 108,00% 0,87 
Italy 44 57 0,5 111 102,00% 0,5 
Netherlands 87 82 1,05 91 131,00% 23,4 
United Kingdom 81 99 0,44 33 124,00% 1,53 
Sweden 89 92 1,07 24 128,00% 0,17 
Algeria 36 0 -1,17 106 100,00% 0,73 
Egypt 36 0 1,28 155 86,00% 1,37 
Ethiopia 33 112 -1,24 84 36,00% 1,6 
Guinea 25 64 -0,93 118 39,00% 2,87 
Kenya 25 0 -1,27 102 68,00% 0,83 
Mali 35 0 -1,74 149 44,00% 2,77 
Morocco 36 0 -0,39 59 69,00% 3,1 
South Africa 44 109 -0,08 119 98,00% 1,67 
China 37 70 -0,46 7 96,00% 2,93 
Philippines 35 0 -0,7 140 88,00% 1,63 
India 38 128 -0,96 178 69,00% 1,5 
Indonesia 36 101 -0,37 170 82,00% 2,63 
Israel 61 66 -0,99 77 102,00% 3,27 
Japan 75 65 1,02 51 102,00% 0,13 
Pakistan 30 66 -2,44 151 42,00% 0,57 
Russia 29 0 -0,84 5 99,00% 2,33 
Singapore 85 0 1,23 1 95,90% 20,93 
Thailand 38 76 -0,91 57 86,00% 2,63 
Turkey 42 72 -1,06 36 115,00% 1,2 
Argentina 32 66 0,08 38 106,00% 1,7 
Bolivia 34 0 -0,36 136 85,00% 3,27 
Brazil 37 108 -0,01 45 95,22% 3,47 
Chile 70 93 0,49 56 100,00% 8,73 
Colombia 37 102 -1,12 180 90,10% 4,23 
Ecuador 32 73 -0,01 148 104,00% 0,73 
Mexico 35 117 -0,76 41 87,00% 2,37 
Peru 36 93 -0,52 69 96,00% 4,9 
Uruguay 74 91 1 104 99,80% 5,07 
Australia 79 83 1,08 4 138,00% 3,47 
Canada 83 79 1,18 49 110,00% 3,03 
USA 76 89 0,62 21 96,00% 1,3 
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Sample countries     Tax burden GDP per capita Inequality 
Dummy 
Africa 
Dummy 
Asia 
Dummy 
South 
America 
Dummy 
Other 
Germany 11,6 45.830,42 0,283 0 0 0 0 
Belgium 25,5 46.595,98 0,266 0 0 0 0 
Denmark 35,1 59.869,30 0,281 0 0 0 0 
Spain 13,9 29.893,08 0,35 0 0 0 0 
France 15,6 42.502,82 0,305 0 0 0 0 
Greece 22,8 22.918,20 0,343 0 0 0 0 
Italy 23,6 35.963,28 0,319 0 0 0 0 
Netherlands 20 51.643,95 0,254 0 0 0 0 
United Kingdom 25,4 42.726,70 0,328 0 0 0 0 
Sweden 26,3 58.977,48 0,249 0 0 0 0 
Algeria 37,2 5.501,68 0,353 1 0 0 0 
Egypt 12,5 3.168,25 0,308 1 0 0 0 
Ethiopia 9,2 475,73 0,336 1 0 0 0 
Guinea 31,9 499,05 0,394 1 0 0 0 
Kenya 15,9 1.203,33 0,477 1 0 0 0 
Mali 15,8 671,65 0,33 1 0 0 0 
Morocco 23,9 3.086,10 0,409 1 0 0 0 
South Africa 25,5 7.261,70 0,631 1 0 0 0 
China 10,4 6.605,18 0,614 0 1 0 0 
Philippines 12,9 2.659,03 0,43 0 1 0 0 
India 10,8 1.489,50 0,339 0 1 0 0 
Indonesia 11,4 3.615,88 0,34 0 1 0 0 
Israel 22,9 35.003,40 0,392 0 1 0 0 
Japan 10,9 41.927,78 0,376 0 1 0 0 
Pakistan 11,2 1.272,30 0,3 0 1 0 0 
Russia 14,3 13.656,28 0,42 0 1 0 0 
Singapore 13,8 54.990,68 0,473 0 1 0 0 
Thailand 17,3 5.916,00 0,394 0 1 0 0 
Turkey 21,4 10.680,08 0,448 0 1 0 0 
Argentina 37,2 13.675,72 0,366 0 0 1 0 
Bolivia 27 2.773,76 0,563 0 0 1 0 
Brazil 14,1 12.248,75 0,547 0 0 1 0 
Chile 17,5 15.026,38 0,521 0 0 1 0 
Colombia 13,4 7.761,20 0,535 0 0 1 0 
Ecuador 13,2 5.830,75 0,493 0 0 1 0 
Mexico 29,7 9.979,20 0,472 0 0 1 0 
Peru 16,5 6.316,23 0,481 0 0 1 0 
Uruguay 18,8 15.745,13 0,413 0 0 1 0 
Australia 22,2 64.873,80 0,305 0 0 0 1 
Canada 11,7 51.841,38 0,321 0 0 0 1 
USA 11,7 52.211,90 0,469 0 0 0 1 
 
 
 
 
